ABSTRACT: Prior research demonstrates that investors respond differently to earnings surprises that are part of a string of consecutive earnings increases or surprises than to those that are not. To shed light on who values these patterns, I compare trading responses of small and large traders to earnings surprises that occur during a series of positive or negative surprises. I find that the relative intensity of small traders' trading response (and, to a lesser extent, that of medium traders) to earnings surprises generally increases as a series progresses. Small traders respond more negatively to the second (third) negative surprise in a series than to the first (second), and more positively for the first three surprises in a positive series. Moreover, I find that announcement-period returns are related to the trading of small and medium traders. These results suggest that less sophisticated smaller traders, responding to earnings series, contribute to previously documented pricing patterns.
price-earnings multiples later in a ''string'' of consecutively increasing earnings. This paper compares the trading responses of investors who make large trades (large traders), whom research has shown to be sophisticated, and investors who make small trades (small traders), whom research has shown to be relatively naïve, to a similar pattern of earnings surprises that occur during a series of either positive or negative surprises. Since the two classes of investors differ in sophistication, differences in their response also sheds light on whether mispricing or risk drive the pricing patterns.
Following prior literature, I measure investor reactions using New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote (TAQ) data, splitting trades into categories based on the dollar value of the trade. I classify the sign (buy versus sell) of the trades using the Lee-Ready algorithm (Lee and Ready 1991; Lee and Radhakrishna 2000; Odders-White 2000) . This study examines each trade group's reaction to a ''series'' of consecutive ''strong positive'' and ''strong negative'' surprises, defined as the top 30 percent and bottom 30 percent of standardized unexpected earnings, respectively. If small traders exhibit a stronger reaction to consistent earnings patterns than large traders, then we should observe their relative trading response becoming more negative (positive) for a series of negative (positive) surprises.
The results show that small traders' reaction relative to large traders becomes more negative over a series of negative surprises, i.e., for the second surprise versus the first and the third versus the second. While the relative reaction becomes insignificantly less negative for the fourth or later surprises compared to the third, the relative reaction remains significantly more negative than the reaction to the first surprise. Similarly, results show that small traders' relative trade reaction becomes generally more positive for a series of positive surprises, although with an insignificant drop for fourth-and-later surprises. Small traders' relative reaction is significantly more positive for the third positive surprise than for the first or second, and for the fourth-and-later than for the first. I find similar results when comparing medium traders with large traders. In contrast, large traders react similarly to surprises in a series even when earnings surprises are defined using analyst forecasts, which proxy more strongly for large traders' expectations (Bhattacharya 2001; Battalio and Mendenhall 2005) , suggesting that the relative-reaction patterns are not due to different earnings expectations of small, medium, and large traders. In contrast to trading during a series, small and large trader reactions to breaks in a series do not differ systematically with the length of the preceding series. Finally, additional analyses verify that small and medium trade imbalances are positively associated with concurrent returns around earnings announcements, even after controlling for large trades and the earnings surprise. These results provide evidence that smaller traders have a preference for consistent performance, as measured by an earnings surprise series, relative to large traders. The results are consistent with ''earnings momentum'' trading by small and medium traders being one driver of the return patterns documented in prior literature, at least for the first several surprises in a series.
This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of which traders react positively to a series of consistent earnings surprises. Bhattacharya (2001) and Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) increase our understanding of post-earnings-announcement drift by showing that small traders respond most strongly to random-walk-based earnings surprises. This study increases our understanding of the market reactions to the time-series-pattern in earnings by building on that literature. Prior work that examines market responses to earnings patterns has focused on price-and returns-based tests (e.g., Barth et al. 1999; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Myers et al. 2007 ). The present study's examination of the trading patterns of small and large traders has the advantage of assessing how different investors respond to the same announcement. This research design complements prior studies, providing evidence that ''earnings-momentum'' trading is stronger among smaller, less sophisticated investors.
One drawback to examining small and large trades is that the method is unlikely to be accurate after about 2002, as discussed in more detail in the ''Data and Research Design'' section. Therefore, I cannot say for certain that the results documented in this paper would extend to recent years. However, the ten-year sample period examined sheds significant light on the basic question of which investors react more strongly to a series of consistent earnings surprises.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the hypothesis development and related literature. Section III explains the empirical methods and data. Section IV presents the primary results and Section V presents additional analyses. Section VI concludes. Barth et al. (1999) , Kasznik and McNichols (2002) , Myers et al. (2007) , and Lev et al. (2008) examine pricing multiples and stock returns related to patterns of consistent earnings increases or consistently positive earnings surprises, while Frieder (2008) investigates aggregate trade imbalances. All of these papers suggest that the market values consistent earnings patterns.
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
However, it is not clear what drives the market premium for consistency. Barth et al. (1999) suggest several possible explanations, which fall into two primary categories: (1) consistent earnings patterns may capture dimensions of growth or risk that the usual proxies for these variables do not capture, or (2) there may be an element of mispricing due to ''earnings momentum'' trading. Intuitively, an investor is engaged in earnings momentum trading if he/she buys (sells) stocks with positive (negative) earnings ''momentum,'' i.e., multiple consecutive periods of positive (negative) earnings results. These two explanations lead to different predictions for investor trading, as described below.
Small and large traders are likely to differ in sophistication. First, investors making larger trades will invest more in acquiring information as fixed costs are employed to earn a larger dollar return. Conversely, an investor with better information will make a larger trade to exploit that information. Easley and O'Hara (1987) develop a theoretical model predicting that larger trades will incorporate more information and Hasbrouck (1988 Hasbrouck ( , 1991 provides empirical evidence consistent with this. Second, large trades tend to be made by institutional investors (Lee and Radhakrishna 2000) . Experimental researchers have found that professionals are more successful in avoiding behavioral biases than nonprofessionals in several accounting and finance contexts (Smith and Kida 1991; Frederickson and Miller 2004) . Finally, a growing body of empirical work finds that small traders make less sophisticated trading decisions than large traders. Bhattacharya (2001) , Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) , Lee (1992) , and Hirshleifer et al. (2008) find that small traders buy stock following earnings announcements even if the earnings surprise is negative. Bhattacharya (2001) and Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) find that small traders rely more on a seasonal random-walk model to form their earnings expectations, even though analyst expectations impound more information. Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) show that discount brokerage account investors fail to earn returns to compensate for transaction costs and buy stocks that perform more poorly than the ones they sell. Bhattacharya et al. (2007) find differences between small and large trading around pro forma earnings announcements. Shanthikumar (2007, 2009) , using the same trade data as this paper, and Mikhail et al. (2007) find that small investors react more naively to analyst recommendations and earnings forecasts than large traders. In all of these settings, small traders appear to make less sophisticated trading decisions than large traders. Turning to the effect of earnings series, if ''earnings momentum'' trading, based on behavioral factors, is a driver of the previously documented price patterns, then small, less sophisticated traders are likely to exhibit stronger earnings momentum trading than large traders.
While small and large traders appear to differ systematically in sophistication, they do not seem to differ systematically in their risk preferences. As Lee (1992) discusses, individuals have larger holdings in not only certain high-risk stocks, such as small firms and over-the-counter stocks, but also certain low-risk stocks such as utilities . Barsky et al. (1997) elicit risk preferences from 11,000 respondents and find no systematic relation between risk preferences and wealth or education. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) find that the share of households' liquid assets in risky assets does not vary with changes in wealth, suggesting that individuals' risk aversion remains steady as wealth changes. Finally, it is not clear how the risk aversion displayed by mutual fund managers compares to that of individuals. Prior literature has shown that for mutual funds, incentive fees increase risk-taking by losers but decrease risk-taking by winners (Elton et al. 2003) . Absent a systematic difference in risk preferences between small and large traders, if the price patterns for earnings series are due to growth or risk, then we would expect large traders to react at least as strongly as small traders, in contrast to the prediction for ''earnings momentum'' trading.
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Examining small and large trades provides direct information on who responds to patterns of consistent earnings performance. Because small and large investors exhibit different levels of sophistication but similar risk preferences, it also provides insight on whether the pricing patterns are related to earnings momentum trading or firm risk. I state the hypothesis predicted by earnings-momentum trading as follows:
H1: Small traders' net buying (selling) increases as a series of positive (negative) earnings surprises continues, relative to large traders.
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Section III discusses the empirical design in more detail. However one important issue is how to define an earnings ''series.' ' Barth et al. (1999) and Myers et al. (2007) focus on ''strings'' of five years of increasing annual and quarterly earnings, respectively. However, these definitions provide only 292 annual and 113 quarterly earnings strings for the sample for which I have trade data. In addition, small and large investors may view small earnings increases differently, making it difficult to attribute a difference in small and large trading to preferences for earnings momentum or differences in earnings expectations. For example, if results show that small traders react more strongly to a string of earnings increases than large traders, then it could be that both groups prefer ''consistency'' but only small traders view a 1 cent increase as good news. In contrast, strong earnings surprises are likely to be viewed as surprises by both investor groups. Thus, I define a ''series'' as a pattern of one to at least four consecutive quarters of strongly positive (top 30 percent), or negative (bottom 30 percent), earnings surprises. Because this definition of a ''series'' differs from corresponding definitions used in prior literature, I replicate the primary analysis in Barth et al. (1999) as a first step.
I conduct additional analyses as well. First, I test the relation between small trades and concurrent returns around earnings announcements to verify that small trades could potentially affect returns. Second, I examine trading after a break in a series. Finally, I conduct various robustness checks.
III. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
The sample covers common stock for U.S. firms on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) between 1993 and 2002, including 2,723 firms and 59,658 earnings announcements. I take returns 1 To see why sophisticated investors will react at least as strongly as unsophisticated investors if returns are due to changes in risk or growth, consider two possibilities for price-adjustment. First, consider the case where prices adjust immediately to the change in risk signaled by the earnings pattern. In this case, both groups hold stocks that are priced correctly, so we would not expect any differential reaction. Second, consider the case where there is some friction in price-adjustment and prices do not adjust immediately. By reacting (buying or selling), sophisticated investors can earn abnormal returns until prices reach equilibrium levels, so we would expect more sophisticated investors to react more strongly. 2 The predictions for small and large traders are relative predictions. It may be the case that even large traders ''prefer consistency.'' However, I argue that if the preference for consistency is based on behavioral factors, then small traders will exhibit a stronger preference. Since it is almost impossible to determine the correct trade response, I use large traders as the benchmark.
from CRSP, earnings data and firm characteristics from Compustat, analyst earnings forecasts from the Institutional Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S), and trade and quote data from the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database.
Measuring Earnings Surprise Events
I define the event date using the quarterly earnings announcement date from Compustat. The main measure of earnings surprise is standardized unexpected earnings, which adjusts for expectations without restricting the sample to firms with analyst coverage. This is important as large trades might dominate the generally larger and higher institutional-ownership firms that have analyst coverage. To calculate standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), I estimate the model used in Foster et al. (1984) and Bernard and Thomas (1989) and assume that earnings expectations are based on a seasonal random-walk with drift. The model defines expected earnings as:
where d i is the earnings drift for firm i. For each stock, I estimate drift as:
where n 16. Unexpected earnings are then standardized by the standard deviation of earnings, as measured by the available subset of the preceding 20 announcements. Thus:
Finally, earnings announcements are ranked by SUE within each year.
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I use analyst forecasts to define an alternative measure of earnings surprises. The surprise is the difference between announced earnings-per-share and the most recent monthly median forecast before the announcement, normalized by stock price as of the forecast consensus date, when there are at least four earnings forecasts for the firm. Using this measure reduces the sample to 29,649 earnings announcements.
Defining the Earnings Surprise Series
I denote the position of a given surprise in an earnings surprise series by S. For a given surprise, S ¼ 1 if the surprise is strongly negative (positive), i.e., in the bottom 30 percent (top 30 percent) of earnings surprises and the preceding surprise for that firm was not strongly negative (positive). S ¼ 2 if it is the second surprise of the same type, strongly negative or positive, S ¼ 3 if it is the third, and so on. An earnings surprise is assigned a value of S equal to 0 if it is neither a strongly negative nor strongly positive surprise, i.e., if it is in the middle 40 percent of earnings surprises. Figure 1 provides an example. Table 1 reports sample statistics for the full sample and subsamples based on S. Between 40 percent and 60 percent of S ¼ 1 and S ¼ 2 surprises are followed by S ¼ 2 and S ¼ 3 surprises, respectively, for both positive and negative series, so that each surprise in the series is likely to be a surprise. The magnitude of standardized unexpected earnings does not vary systematically with S. Firm size and book-to-market do not vary systematically for positive earnings surprise series.
However, for a negative series, firm size decreases and book-to-market increases. The change in book-to-market is driven by the decrease in market value. Book value of equity decreases with S for negative series; however, market value decreases more strongly. Given these patterns, I include size as a control variable in the analysis.
Measuring Small and Large Trading
Following Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) , I restrict the sample to 1993-2002 common stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to ensure a robust separation of small and large trades. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) discuss some of the potential problems with these methods after 2002. Increased splitting of trades by institutions, internalization, program trading, and more frequent quote updating reduce the efficacy of the small/large trade distinction and the Lee-Ready algorithm.
I classify each NYSE trade from the TAQ data as buyer or seller initiated using the modified Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm recommended in Odders-White (2000) . The algorithm involves matching a trade to the most recent quote preceding the trade by at least five seconds. If a price is nearer the bid (ask) price, then it is classified as seller (buyer) initiated. If a trade is at the bid-ask
FIGURE 1 Defining Earnings Surprise Series
This figure presents an example for the assignment of ''S'' values, where S marks how far into a series a given surprise falls. Earnings surprises are assigned to deciles (0 through 9) in each quarter, where a decile of 0, 1, or 2 indicates an earnings surprise in the most negative 30 percent, while a decile of 7, 8, or 9 indicates a surprise in the most positive 30 percent. If a surprise is the first in a series of same-type extreme surprises (bottom 30 percent, i.e., deciles 0, 1, or 2, or top 30 percent, i.e., deciles 7, 8, or 9), then it receives a value of S ¼ 1. If it is second in a series, then S ¼ 2 and so on. ''Mild'' surprises, in the middle 40 percent, i.e., deciles 3 through 6, are assigned S ¼ 0. Size ¼ market value and is reported in millions of dollars; B/M ¼ (book-to-market) ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity; and SUE ¼ standardized unexpected earnings based on a random-walk with drift earnings expectations model. midpoint, then it is classified using a ''tick test,'' comparing the trade price to the price of the previous trade. 4 To separate small and large trades I use four cutoffs: $5,000, $10,000, $20,000, and $50,000.
5
The analyses in the paper focus on ''small'' trades of less than $5,000, ''medium'' trades between $5,000 and $50,000, and ''large'' trades of at least $50,000, motivated by Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) who show that dollar-based cutoffs create less noise in separating individuals from institutions than share-based cutoffs and that, for their three-month sample from 1990-1991, a very low (high) cutoff such as $5,000 ($50,000) is most effective in separating out individuals (institutions).
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Calculating Abnormal Trading Measures This paper focuses on abnormal trade imbalance as the primary variable of interest, calculated following the method of Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) . 8 Intuitively, if every trade after an announcement were initiated by the buy (sell) side, then the trading reaction to that announcement is extremely positive (negative). To capture this concept, raw trade imbalance is defined as:
for firm i, investor type x, and date t. Following Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) , I normalize raw trade imbalance by subtracting the non-event-time firm-year mean, and dividing by the standard deviation, with:
where I exclude trading days À5 through 5 around earnings announcements in calculating E(IMB i,x,year(t) ) and Var(IMB i,x,year(t) ). The normalization thus controls for systematic differences in trading behavior for different stocks, trading groups, and times, but does not correct for differences in trading reactions to earnings announcements.
IV. RESULTS

Pricing Patterns for Series of Earnings Surprises
Because my definition of ''series'' differs from the various definitions of earnings strings used in prior literature, this section first replicates the primary analysis in Barth et al. (1999) for ''series. '' Following Barth et al. (1999) , I regress share price at quarter-end on net income per share, the position of a surprise in a series, and control variables for book value of equity, growth in book value of equity, earnings variance, debt-to-equity ratio, an indicator for banks and utilities, and indicators for different years. All control variables except book value of equity are interacted with net income. The key difference from Barth et al. (1999) is in the measure for an announcement's position in a series. This analysis uses indicators for S ¼ 1, S ¼ 2, S ¼ 3, and S ! 4, separately for top and bottom 30 percent surprises, whereas Barth et al. (1999) use an indicator for five consecutive years of increasing earnings, interacted with net income. Table 2 displays the results.
The results indicate that the first surprise in a series does not have an associated increase in price-to-earnings (P/E) multiples. In fact, the coefficient on I(S ¼ 1) is significantly positive (negative) for bottom 30 percent (top 30 percent) surprises, indicating that the market prices firms with S ¼ 1 negative (positive) earnings surprises higher (lower) than would be predicted by a linear model of price to earnings, and other included variables, alone. This is not particularly surprising, since we might expect lower P/E multiples for firms with more extreme earnings surprises, where the market may expect those earnings to be less persistent. The key question is whether there are pricing patterns related with the progression of a series, as defined in this paper. The test statistics in the right-most column of Table 2 indicate that there are. Share price is significantly increasing (decreasing) for series of strongly positive (negative) SUE, for S ¼ 2, 3, and S ! 4, as compared to S ¼ 1, 2, and 3, respectively, after controlling for the P/E multiples associated with net income and the other control variables. These results confirm that earnings surprise ''series,'' as defined in this paper are associated with similar pricing patterns to the patterns documented in prior literature. 
Small, Medium, and Large Trade Reactions
This section presents results for the trading reactions of the different trade-size groups to a series of strong positive and strong negative surprises, testing H1. The primary specification is as follows: 
In untabulated analysis, I replicate the Barth et al. (1999) model using interactions between S-value and net income (NI), with qualitatively similar results. Results show a significantly negative coefficient on NI Ã I(S ¼ 1) and significantly less negative coefficients for S ¼ 2 and 3. The difference for S ¼ 3 and S ! 4 is insignificant, pvalue ¼ 0.11, however the value for S ! 4 is significantly higher than the values for S ¼ 1 and 2.
where t is the trading day in event-time, e is the specific earnings surprise, and I(lowSUE e ) (I(highSUE e )) is an indicator that the standardized unexpected earnings surprise value for e is in the bottom 30 percent (top 30 percent) for the given period. I(S e ¼ (!) X) is the indicator that the earnings surprise e occurs in position X (occurs in position X or greater) in a series, for X ¼ 1, 2, and 3 (X ¼ 4), as defined in Section III. The dependent variable is the sum of abnormal trade imbalance over trading 
À1.273*** 3.57 I(Bottom 30% SUE) Ã I(S ¼ 2) 0.00 I(Bottom 30% SUE) Ã I(S ! 4) À2.220*** 7.19 I(Bottom 30% SUE) Ã I(S ¼ 3) 0.00 *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance of coefficient estimates at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. This table presents coefficient estimates from robust regressions of share price on Net Income (per share), indicators for S value for negative (bottom 30 percent SUE) and positive (top 30 percent SUE) series, and control variables. If a surprise is the first in a series of same-type surprises (top or bottom 30 percent Standardized Unexpected Earnings), then S ¼ 1. If it is the second, then S ¼ 2 and so on. The sample contains quarterly earnings surprises for NYSE firms from 1993 through 2002. The rightmost two columns provide p-values for one-tailed tests for the differences between coefficients, testing for decreases in coefficients on I(Bottom 30% SUE) Ã I(S ¼ X) with X and increases for Top 30 percent SUE.
Variable Definitions: BVE ¼ book value of equity; NI ¼ net income per share; I(banks and utilities) ¼ an indicator that takes the value 1 if a firm is a bank or utility; Growth ¼ annualized growth in BVE from five years prior; Earnings Variance ¼ standard deviation of earnings changes relative to the same quarter in the prior year, over five years; Debt/Equity ¼ book value of debt over book value of equity; and NI Ã X ¼ interaction of NI and variable X. days À5 through 5 in event time, to control for potential differences in the timing of small and large trader reactions. 10 The remaining variables are control variables. SUE e is the standardized unexpected earnings value. 11 I(Q e ¼ 4) is an indicator for the fourth fiscal quarter. Ln(Size e ) is the log of market value at the end of the fiscal quarter. InstOwn e is the percentage of shares owned by 13F reporting institutions. Bushee (1998) and Ke and Petroni (2004) provide evidence that ''transient'' institutional investors are more likely to trade on earnings information and earnings patterns than other institutional investors. Thus, the model includes the percentage of shares owned by transient institutions, TransientInstOwn e .
12 NumAn e and ln(NumAn) e capture the number of analysts reporting earnings forecasts for event e. Finally, the model includes industry fixed effects, based on two-digit SIC codes. Coefficients on the variables I(low/highSUE e ) Ã I(S e ¼ X) and I(low/highSUE e ) Ã I(S e ! X) reflect the sensitivity of a trade group's trading to the given earnings surprise category, controlling for the other factors. Thus, H1 concerns changes in the differences of b i coefficients for small and large traders as S e increases. For example, H1 predicts that small traders' relative reaction will become more negative for a negative series, which implies that (b 1Small À b 1Large . b 2Small À b 2Large ). Table 3 displays results for each trade size group, as well as statistics for the difference in coefficient estimates for trades less than $5,000 versus trades of at least $50,000, the focus of this study. Panel A displays regression results, while Panel B provides test statistics for the differences in coefficients for different positions in a series. Figure 2 shows that in terms of the magnitude of reaction, controlling for other factors, the smallest traders react more negatively (positively) for surprises that are later in a negative (positive) series, with the exception of S ! 4 positive surprises. The reactions of larger traders depend much less on a surprises' location within a series. The test statistics in Table 3 report the statistical significance of the numbers plotted in Figure 2 .
Looking at the S ¼ 1 line in the top half of Figure 2 , and at column 6 of Panel A of Table 3 , we can see that small traders react significantly more positively than large traders to the first negative surprise in a series, but looking at the S ¼ 3 and S ! 4 lines in Figure 2 , and column 6, we can see that they react significantly more negatively than large traders to the third and fourth-or-later surprises in a negative series. Looking to Panel B of Table 3 , we can see that the relative reaction of small traders versus large traders becomes significantly more negative for S ¼ 2 versus S ¼ 1 and S ¼ 3 versus S ¼ 2. The reaction becomes slightly less negative for S ! 4 versus S ¼ 3, but the decrease in negativity is not statistically significant, and the S ! 4 relative reaction remains significantly more negative than the S ¼ 1 relative reaction. Thus, the results for negative series for S ¼ 1, 2, and 3 support H1. The results for S ! 4 are not consistent with H1, but are not statistically significant in either direction.
It may be surprising that small traders react more positively to the first negative surprise in a series than large traders, and that the difference between the two trader groups is insignificant for the second surprise in a negative series. However, one possible interpretation is that small traders have more of a preference for ''earnings momentum'' than large traders, but small traders start with a weaker reaction to the earnings surprises than large traders at the beginning of a series. Then the ''earnings momentum'' preference would result in small traders gradually reacting similarly to large traders, and possibly passing them.
Focusing on positive series, column 6 of Panel A shows that small traders react insignificantly more negatively than large traders to the first positive surprise in a series and insignificantly more 10 Results are similar using alternative event windows or excluding surprises without trading by the given trade-size group. 11 I use three alternative models to control for the earnings surprise value, for robustness tests, with similar results.
First, I include indicators for each SUE decile, second, standardized rank of SUE, and third, SUE, I(SUE , 0), SUE Ã I(SUE , 0) and SUE 2 . 12 I thank Brian Bushee for providing the transient institution data.
positively to the third and fourth. We can see these patterns in Figure 2 . The increase in relative reaction is significant for S ¼ 3 versus S ¼ 1 and 2, and for S ! 4 versus S ¼ 1. We again see a decrease for S ! 4 versus S ¼ 3, but it is not statistically significant. Thus, the results for positive series for S ¼ 1, 2, and 3 are generally supportive of H1, although they are not as strong as for negative series. The results for S ! 4 are not consistent with H1, but are not significant in either direction. Consistent with Figure 2 , the results are stronger and more consistent for negative series than for positive series. Including both the results for negative and positive series, I fail to reject H1. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance of coefficient estimates at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Panel A presents coefficient estimates from regressions of abnormal trade imbalance, summed over trading days À5 through 5, on indicators for S value, separately for surprises in the top and bottom 30 percent of SUE, standardized unexpected earnings, and control variables. If a surprise is the first in a series of same-type surprises (top or bottom 30 percent), then S ¼ 1. If it is the second, then S ¼ 2 and so on. The sample contains quarterly earnings surprises for NYSE firms from 1993 through 2002. ''Difference ,5 versus !50'' displays results for the difference between coefficient estimates for trades of ,$5,000 and trades of !$50,000, estimated using a stacked regression, for the subset of observations with share price less than or equal to $50. For each column the sample is restricted to firm-days on which share price is low enough so that the given trade size is possible with a round lot of 100 shares. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-firm correlation. Panel B displays the differences between coefficient estimates reported in Panel A. p-values for the differences, based on F-tests, are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests are used for columns 1-5, and one-tailed tests are used for column 6. Significant values in Panel B column 6, at the 10 percent level, are shown in bold.
Variable Definitions: I(Fiscal Quarter 4) ¼ an indicator that takes the value 1 if the given quarter is the fourth quarter of the firm's fiscal year; Ln(Size) ¼ natural log of market value; Institutional Ownership ¼ percent of shares owned by 13F reporting institutions; Transient Institution Ownership ¼ percent of shares owned by institutions that are classified as ''transient'' following Bushee (1998); Number of Analysts and ln(Number of Analysts) ¼ number of analysts reporting forecasts of quarterly earnings for the firm in I/B/E/S and ln(Number of Analysts), respectively; and Industry ¼ as defined by the two-digit SIC code.
FIGURE 2 Trade Reaction to Earnings Surprises in a Series
This figure presents coefficient estimates from regressions of abnormal trade imbalance, summed over trading days À5 through 5, on indicators for S value for positive (top 30 percent) and negative (bottom 30 percent) SUE series, and control variables, as described in Table 3 . The figure plots the relevant coefficient estimates from Table 3 . Thus each point represents the sensitivity of the given trade-size-group's trade imbalance to earnings surprises with position S in a positive or negative series, controlling for other factors that may drive trade imbalance.
For completeness, Table 3 reports trade responses for each of five trade-size categories. As seen in Figure 2 , the results indicate that as trade size grows, the reaction to the first (S ! 4) negative surprise becomes more negative (less negative) in magnitude. Investors' reaction to the first (third) positive surprise is generally, although not monotonically, increasing (decreasing) with trade-size. The pattern for S ! 4 is more mixed. These results, overall, suggest that there is a gradual progression between the behavior of the very small traders and the very large traders. In fact, for the relative reaction of trades between $5,000 and $50,000 versus trades larger than $50,000, three of the six relevant difference-of-differences for negative series are significantly negative and four of the six relevant difference-of-differences for positive series are significantly positive. Thus, it is not just small traders who exhibit a relative preference for ''earnings momentum''; medium traders exhibit a preference relative to large traders as well.
The gradual progression is important to evaluating the potential market impact of earnings momentum trading. I directly examine the relation between the return response to earnings surprises and small trading in Section V. However, the appearance of relative earnings momentum trading among medium traders suggests that earnings momentum trading may have a larger price impact than if it appeared only for the smallest traders.
Finally, although Equation (6) includes the earnings surprise value, SUE, as a control variable, it still could be that pooling deciles 0-2 and deciles 7-9 affects results. I modify Equation (6) to include interaction terms between indicators for each SUE decile and S value. Results for the change in the relative reaction of small versus large traders with respect to S are reported in Table 4 . The differenceof-difference results reported in Table 4 are analogous to column 6 of Table 3 Panel B. Results are generally consistent. No single decile appears to drive the overall results, nor are there statistically significant results contrary to H1 in any decile. The results by decile, as with the main results, are stronger for bottom 30 percent surprises than top 30 percent, and are in the opposite direction but statistically insignificant for S ! 4 versus S ¼ 3 for four of the six relevant deciles. Overall, these results show that the relative reaction of small versus large traders is stronger for earnings surprises later in a series whether those surprises are in the most extreme deciles or are closer to the median.
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS The Market Impact of Small Trades
Recent research has found that trading by retail investors and small traders is correlated both across investors and across securities (Kumar and Lee 2006; Barber et al. 2009 ). Because of this, the trades of even very small investors can have a significant impact on the market (see De Long et al. 1990; Baker and Wurgler 2006; Kumar and Lee 2006; Barber et al. 2009 ). The results presented in Section IV show earnings momentum trading by small and medium traders, relative to large traders, consistent with the previously documented market valuation of earnings growth consistency. This section directly tests the relation between small and medium trading and the concurrent market return around earnings announcements to verify that small and medium traders could be affecting returns. Table 5 displays results for the relation of returns over days [À5, 5] with trading over the same window. The results show that trades of less than $5,000 exhibit a significant positive relation with concurrent returns. A one standard deviation change in the trade imbalance for trades less than $5,000 corresponds to returns of 0.047 percent over the same window, a change in returns of roughly 7 percent. The second column includes control variables for large trades and SUE (using the standardized rank of SUE, ranging from 0 to 1). While the magnitude of the coefficient on small trades decreases, it remains positive and statistically significant. Trades between $5,000 and $50,000 also relate significantly to concurrent returns. While this analysis does not establish causation, the results are consistent with smaller traders' earnings momentum trading contributing to the pricing patterns observed for series.
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Breaks in Series Barth et al. (1999) show that the higher P/E multiples for earnings strings disappear after a ''break'' in the string, the first earnings decrease after a string of increases.
14 Examining breaks serves two purposes. First, as a robustness test, if omitted firm characteristics drive the increasing reaction pattern of small traders relative to large traders, then to the extent that these firm characteristics are persistent, they should affect trading in ''Break'' quarters as well. Second, the test relates to the prior literature on breaks in strings. Table 6 presents results for Equation (6) augmented with indicators for a ''break'' in a series. ''I(Break from Bottom 30 percent (Top 30 percent) SUE Series, S ¼ (!)X)'' is the first surprise in the top 70 percent (bottom 70 percent) following a negative (positive) series of length X. For parsimony, the table presents only the coefficients on ''Break'' terms; however, all other variables in Equation (6) are included in the estimation.
The results in Table 6 indicate that small traders' relative reaction to a break does not depend on the length of a series. While small traders' relative reaction versus large traders becomes more negative (positive) for a longer negative (positive) series, their relative reaction at the break does not seem to vary systematically with the length of the series. For negative series, small and large trader reactions to breaks do not differ significantly for any of the four breaks examined. The difference-of-differences are also largely insignificant, with only one of the six being significant: a significant increase in the relative reaction for S ! 4 versus S ¼ 3. Small and large trader reactions to breaks in positive series only differ significantly for S ¼ 2, and only two of the difference-ofdifferences are significant: a significant increase from S ¼ 1 to S ¼ 2, and S ¼ 1 to S ! 4. Again, there is no systematic pattern in the relative reaction to the break as S increases.
Overall, these results suggest that, first, omitted firm characteristics are not driving the main results, to the extent that these firm characteristics persist for at least one quarter. Second, these results suggest that small and large traders react similarly when a series breaks. This could be consistent with earnings momentum trading creating an ''over-reaction'' that is corrected when a series breaks, where small traders are more involved in the over-reaction, but large traders are equally involved in the correction.
Analyst-Based Earnings Surprise
One potential concern with the main results is that large traders' earnings expectations may be captured more accurately with analyst forecasts (Bhattacharya 2001; Battalio and Mendenhall *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance of coefficient estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of cumulative raw returns, summed over trading days À5 through 5 around earnings announcement dates, on abnormal trade imbalance, summed over the same window, a constant, and the standardized rank of the earnings surprise (SUE) ranging from 0 to 1. The earnings surprise sample contains all earnings surprises for NYSE sample firms from 1993 through 2002. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-firm correlation.
2005). In particular, we may only observe an increasing large-trade response by examining analystbased surprises. Table 7 , Panel A, displays results for earnings surprises and series defined using analyst forecasts. While large traders do appear to react consistently with analyst-based surprises, with positive significant coefficients on I(Top 30 percent Surprise) Ã I(S ¼ X) for X ¼ 1 and 2, and a *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance of coefficient estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of abnormal trade imbalance, summed over trading days À5 through 5, on indicators for S value, separately for positive and negative series, control variables defined below, and fixed effects for industry, as defined by two-digit SIC code, as in Equation (6), supplemented by indicators for ''Break'' quarters. If a surprise is the first in a series of same-type (top or bottom 30 percent) surprises, then S ¼ 1. If it is the second, then S ¼ 2 and so on. If a surprise is the first after a series of length S that is not a part of the series, then it is a Break surprise. The sample contains quarterly earnings surprises for NYSE firms from 1993 through 2002. ''Difference ,5 versus !50'' displays results for the difference between coefficient estimates for trades of ,$5,000 and trades of !$50,000, estimated using a stacked regression, for the subset of observations with stock price less than or equal to $50. For each column the sample is restricted to firm-days on which stock price is low enough so that the given trade size is possible with a round lot of 100 shares. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-firm correlation.
Variable Definitions: SUE ¼ standardized unexpected earnings; I(Fiscal Quarter 4), ¼ an indicator that takes the value 1 if the given quarter is the final quarter of the firm's fiscal year; ln(Size) ¼ natural log of market value; Institutional Ownership ¼ percent of shares owned by 13F reporting institutions; Transient Institution Ownership ¼ percent of shares owned by institutions that are classified as ''transient'' following Bushee (1998) ; and Number of Analysts and ln(Number of Analysts) ¼ number of analysts reporting forecasts of quarterly earnings for the firm in I/B/E/S and ln(Number of Analysts), respectively. and trades of !$50,000, estimated using a stacked regression, for the subset of observations with stock price less than or equal to $50. For each column the sample is restricted to firm-days on which stock price is low enough so that the given trade size is possible with a round lot of 100 shares. For Panels A and C, t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-firm correlation. The specific variations are described below. Panels B and D display the differences between coefficient estimates reported in Panels A and C, respectively. p-values for the differences, based on F-tests, are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests are used for columns 1-3 and 5-7, and one-tailed tests are used following Bushee (1998);
Number of Analysts and ln(Number of Analysts) ¼ the number of analysts reporting forecasts of quarterly earnings for the firm in I/B/E/S and ln(Number of Analysts), respectively.
significantly negative coefficient for I(Bottom 30 percent Surprise) Ã I(S ¼ 1), there is no evidence of large traders reacting more strongly as either the positive or negative series progresses. Coefficient differences, presented in Panel B, are insignificant. In untabulated analyses, I examine trade reactions for each earnings surprise decile, analogously to Table 4 , and find no evidence of large traders reacting more strongly for series. While small and medium trading is not the focus of this test, I document results for completeness. Focusing on column 4, the difference between small and large trades, there is weaker evidence for an ''increasing reaction'' for small traders relative to large traders than in the main tests. For surprises in the bottom 30 percent, two of the six relevant differences are significant, and for surprises in the top 30 percent, three of the six differences are significant. Given that the analystbased expectations model is less likely to capture small trader expectations (Bhattacharya 2001; Battalio and Mendenhall 2005) , it is not surprising that I find less evidence of an increasingly strong relative reaction.
Series of Positive and Negative SUE
The primary analysis focuses on strong positive (top 30 percent of SUE) and strong negative (bottom 30 percent) surprises to eliminate the possible confounding effects of ''expected'' small surprises, which is important when comparing small and large traders who may view small surprises differently. However, prior literature on strings focuses on positive earnings changes (e.g., Barth et al. 1999; Myers et al. 2007; Ke et al. 2003; Ke and Petroni 2004) . Thus, this subsection examines trading for series of positive (SUE . 0) and negative (SUE , 0) earnings announcements. For clarity, I label ''S'' values defined using SUE . 0 and SUE , 0 as S þ/À .
Using this definition, all surprises have a value of at least 1 for S þ/À . In order to avoid collinearity with the included industry fixed effects, I exclude the term for I(Negative Surprise) Ã I(S þ/À ¼ 1). The results are reported in Table 7 , Panels A and B. There is no evidence of a more negative reaction from small traders, relative to large traders, as a negative series progresses. However, for positive series the difference between small and large trades becomes significantly more positive as the series continues. The difference is monotonically increasing, with statistically significant differences for S þ/À ! 4 versus S þ/À ¼ 1, 2, and 3, and for S þ/À ¼ 3 versus S þ/À ¼ 1. Thus, results are qualitatively similar for ''positive'' series as they are for ''strong positive'' series, but there is no evidence of increasing reactions for purely ''negative'' series as there is for ''strong negative'' series. Given that the prior literature has focused on strings of positive earnings changes, this analysis indicates that the primary results in the paper extend to a definition of series that is closer to that used in prior literature, strengthening the link between the small/large trade results documented in this paper and the price/return results from prior literature.
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Alternative Trade Imbalance Measures
This subsection presents two robustness tests using alternative trade-imbalance measures that control directly for prior returns. On average, a firm with prior positive (negative) earnings surprises will have had prior positive (negative) returns. It is possible that a naïve reaction to past returns would affect trading during a series.
For the first measure, I regress abnormal trade imbalance on cumulative abnormal returns over the prior day, week, month, and quarter: trading day intervals Table 7 , Panel C reports results from estimating Equation (6) using the return-adjusted tradeimbalance measure. Focusing on column 4, the difference between small and large traders, we can see that small traders react increasingly negatively to a series of bottom 30 percent surprises, relative to large traders. Five of the six relevant difference-of-differences in Panel D, column 4 are statistically significant. While the results are not as strong for positive series, they are similar to the main results reported in Table 3 , with statistically significant increases in the difference between small and large trader reactions from S ¼ 1 and 2, to S ¼ 3 and S ¼ 1, to S ! 4.
Based on Chordia et al. (2002) and Frieder (2008) , I define a second measure that controls for calendar-effects, serial correlation in the trade imbalance variable, and dependence of trade imbalance on prior returns. 17 The right half of Table 7 , Panels C and D reports regression results and tests for differences in coefficients, respectively, using this alternative trade imbalance measure. The results are qualitatively similar to the primary results, and similar to the results for returnadjusted abnormal trade imbalance. In untabulated analyses, I replicate Table 4 using both the return-adjusted trade measure and the trade measure adjusted for calendar-effects. Results are similar to those presented in Table 4 and slightly stronger, using these alternative abnormal trade measures.
The results presented in Table 7 , Panels C and D further support the results presented in Section IV, i.e., that small traders react more strongly to a series of similar earnings surprises, relative to large traders. While the primary specification in Equation (6) controls for important factors that may drive trade, the results in Panels C and D show that results are robust to controlling explicitly for prior returns, calendar-time effects, and prior trade imbalances.
18 If anything, results for negative series and S ! 4 are more strongly consistent with H1 once I explicitly control for prior returns.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper documents investor reactions to the time-series of earnings surprises. The results document that smaller traders react generally more negatively relative to large traders as a series of strongly negative surprises progresses, and more positively for the first three positive surprises in a series of positive surprises. These results are robust to many method variations and controls. The paper also documents that the announcement-period market reaction to earnings surprises is significantly related to small and medium traders' concurrent trading. Together, these results are consistent with the price/returns patterns documented in Barth et al. (1999) , Myers et al. (2007) , and Lev et al. (2008) reflecting stronger ''earnings momentum'' trading on the part of small and medium traders than on the part of large traders, at least for the first three quarters in a series. Given differences in small and large traders' sophistication, but the lack of systematic differences in their 16 The untabulated results indicate that large traders are ''momentum'' traders, buying more strongly when prior returns have been higher, while small and medium traders appear to be ''contrarians,'' consistent with prior evidence (Grinblatt et al. 1995; Kaniel et al. 2008) . 17 Shanthikumar (2004) describes details of the procedure and insights for calendar-effects in returns. 18 I conduct a variety of additional robustness tests. The primary results are robust to the inclusion of fixed-effects for each security, to control for any potential variation in trade imbalance across firms. The results are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects for each of the 40 sample quarters as well as the inclusion of fixed effects for each of 100 groups defined by size decile and book-to-market decile.
risk preferences, this suggests that the price/return patterns early in a series may be due more to unsophisticated investors than to changes in firm risk. The small and large investor reaction to earnings series documented here is also relevant to behavioral finance models that predict that investors will react more strongly as similar information is released (Barberis et al. 1998; Daniel et al. 1998; Mullainathan 2002 ). These models show that increasing investor reactions can explain both short-run momentum and long-run mean-reversal in returns. There is disagreement on whether investors display a preference for consistency in laboratory settings (Bloomfield and Hales 2002; Asparouhova et al. 2009 ). This paper documents that small traders display a relative preference for consistency in market trading.
The trading evidence provided in this paper shows that, relative to large traders, small traders are more sensitive to earnings information later in a series of similar surprises, particularly for negative series and for the first three quarters of positive series. By stepping beyond aggregate market response measures such as price and returns, these results increase our understanding of the market's reaction to the time-series pattern of earnings information.
